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Although the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel' is fairly
predictable in the United States, the privilege is subject to many different
interpretations in foreign countries. This has become an issue during the
last thirty years as in-house counsel at large U.S. corporations have seen
their responsibilities expand both geographically and substantively.2 This
process began shortly after World War II, when American corporations
traveled to Europe with the Marshall Plan to help rebuild the war-torn
*J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Stephen Latham for reviewing an earlier version of this article. I would also
like to thank my mom and dad for their support.
'This article uses the terms "in-house counsel," "corporate counsel," "general counsel,"
and "corporate attorneys" interchangeably to describe lawyers who work in a legal capacity
for a company as opposed to attorneys who work for a private law firm.
2 See Mary C. Daly, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: The Role of the General
Counsel: Perspective: The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a
Global Organization: The Role of General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1057-58, (Sum-
mer, 1997) (Professor Daly's article addresses "the intersection of two of the most signifi-
cant changes in corporate legal practice in the United States over the past thirty years: the
growth in number, prestige, and power of in-house counsel and the globalization of the busi-
ness and capital markets."). See also Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid Model for
Facilitating Cross-Border Legal Practice: The Agreement Between the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1382, 1384 (April, 1998) (noting that
the globalization of the legal profession is demonstrated by the fact that "cross-border legal
practice is both increasing and increasingly important, throughout the world.").
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economies 3 and continued in subsequent years as U.S. companies expanded
into countries in South America, Asia, and Africa.4 Now American multi-
nationals frequently maintain operations on each continent.5
In addition to expanded geographic responsibilities, a greater role in
the legal activities of their companies has made the attorney-client privilege
more important to corporate practitioners 6 As one group of scholars has
noted: "The 'in-house' lawyers of large corporations have taken over the
role of general counseling previously handled by senior partners of the large
law firms, and house counsel offices have assumed more of the burden of
routine legal work and the management of the work of outside law firms."
7
Thus, general counsel now find the need to communicate with company
employees around the world about issues ranging from finm-wide labor and
employment practices to regional antitrust problems.!
3See generally Roger J. Goebel, Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law Collo-
quium: The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice: Professional Qualification and
Education Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap,
63 TuL. L. REv. 443, 445 (February, 1989) (noting that following World War II the United
States began to "export capital and technology initially to Europe and Latin America, then to
Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world.").4 1d.
51d. Further evidence of this trend is that during the last 10 years, courts have seen a sig-
nificant increase in lawsuits involving foreign and multinational corporations. See Lucinda
A. Low, Virtually All Areas of Law Profession Face Globalization, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5,
1996, at C9; Hans Smit, The Explosion in International Litigation, METROPOLITAN CORP.
CouNs., Oct. 1996, at 59.6For a good overview of the changes at in-house legal groups, see Daly, supra note 2, at
1059-65 (addressing the "shift in power from outside law firms to the offices of general
counsel."); Peter H. Burkard, Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Mul-
tinational Corporate Counsel, 20 Int'l Law. 677, 686 (Spring, 1986) (stating that multina-
tional corporations have turned to fully qualified lawyers to work in-house since it is
virtually impossible for outside counsel to adequately advise the corporation in all of the fo-
rums where possesses operations). Along these same lines, in-house lawyers have also as-
sumed responsibility for managing corporate law compliance measures, which have
increased in recent years. For a comprehensive discussion of in-house counsel and internal
company legal audits, see Richard S. Gruner, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: The
Role of the General Counsel: Perspective: General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Pro-
grams and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1114 (Summer, 1997) (noting that
"[tihe activities of general counsel in corporate organizations are changing in response to in-
creasing demands for corporate law compliance and expanding knowledge about how to ef-
fective manage law compliance in organizational settings."). In addition, as Professor
Gruner also points out, part of these new duties include "becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated in recommending the use of organizational management techniques for preventing or
minimizing legal liability of corporate organizations." 1d.7David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R. Davis, Global Restruc-
turing and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of
Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L.R. 407,435 (1994).
'See, e.g., Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 (in-
volving in-house counsel discussions with European managers about European Community
("EC") antitrust issues); and Re Deere & Co. v. Cofabel NV, Commission Decision of De-
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In the United States, in-house attorneys have traditionally relied on the
attorney-client privilege to P rotect the confidentiality of legal conversations
with company employees. By shielding these discussions from court-
ordered discovery, the privilege, in theory, encourages full and frank disclo-
sure from corporate officials about legal problems within the organization
and thereby promotes general compliance with the law. 0 Outside the
United States, however, a company lawyer's discussions with foreign man-
agers may not be protected by the privilege." Some countries extend the
privilege to corporate attorneys, some jurisdictions withhold the privilege,
and still other nations qualify the privilege for in-house counsel. 12 The gaps
in the privilege at the international level present a major problem for gen-
eral counsel. 13 In the worst case scenario, the company's own legal opin-
ions could be used against it by a foreign tribunal. 4
cember 14, 1984, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 554 (concerning American in-house counsel advice to
European managers about EC antitrust issues).
9 See Alexander C. Black, What Corporate Communications Are Entitled to Attorney-
Client Privilege-Modern Cases, 27 A.L.R. 5th 76, 76 (1997) ("Corporate clients rely on the
protection of the attorney-client privilege for confidential communications with in-house and
outside counsel, both in extraordinary matters such as internal investigations into corporate
wrongdoing and in such everyday legal matters as employment decisions and contract nego-
tiations.'). This note focuses on the attorney-client privilege rather than the ethical obliga-
tion of attorneys to keep the confidences of their clients. State specific rules and codes of
conduct govern attorneys in the United States. These rules are generally the same regardless
of whether an attorney practices law as an in-house lawyer or at a private law firm. See
Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client
Privilege in the United States and the European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
145, 168 (Winter, 1995). Normally, only the attorney-client privilege bars discovery and
therefore is of concern to corporate practitioners.
10 See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
tt See infra Part 111. It should be noted that in foreign jurisdictions, the law of the forum
usually governs procedural matters such as the attorney-client privilege. See Developments
in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1050 (1961); In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 13 F.R1D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1962); Arthur Andersen Co. v. Finesilver, 546
F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096, (1977). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS @122, 127 (1971):
@122 Issues Relating to Judicial Administration: A court usually applies its own local
law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it applies the local law
rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.
@127 Pleading and Conduct of Proceedings: The local law of the forum governs rules of
pleading and the conduct of proceedings in court.
12 See infra Part III.A.
13 Many problems arise when communications between in-house counsel and company
employees are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. In countries that do not recog-
nize a privilege for in-house counsel, for example, corporate attorneys have been frustrated
in their efforts to advise their corporate clients. Commenting on two cases that withheld the
attorney-client privilege from in-house counsel at the European Community level, one prac-
titioner has noted: "The AM&S and John Deere cases have considerably choked off free and
uninhibited internal written discussions of a company's obligations and liabilities under EEC
competition law, and it seems that this state of affairs is not only detrimental to the company
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To reduce this risk, general counsel at multinationals should become
familiar with the parameters of the attorney-client privilege at the interna-
tional level' 5 and use this knowledge to devise strategies to protect the cor-
poration's sensitive information in foreign jurisdictions. 16 Part II of this
comment begins by describing the roots of the modem attorney-client
privilege in the United States and its extension to in-house counsel. 7 This
section provides a context for analyzing the privilege as it is applied to cor-
porate counsel at the international level. Part HI then continues by setting
forth the global parameters of the privilege for in-house counsel.'8 This
section illustrates why general counsels need to take additional measures to
itself, but also to society as a whole." Burkard, supra note 6, at 686. The U.S. Supreme
Court has also noted the problem with different applications of the attorney-client privilege:
If the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must
be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
14See, e.g., Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575,
pts. 24 & 27, at 1612 (holding that AM & S' own in-house legal memoranda were not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege in matters before the European Court of Justice); and
Re Deere & Co. v. Cofabel NV, Commission Decision of December 14, 1984, [1985] 2
C.M.L.P. 554, pts. 21, 27, at 560-62 (legal memorandum from John Deere's in-house coun-
sel to managers in Europe were used against it to show intentional violation of EC antitrust
laws). In Deere & Co., the court opinion, for example, stated: "Deere and Company knew
that such conduct, and, in particular, the contractual export ban, was contrary to EEC and
national competition law. It was advised on this by its in-house counsel." Id. pt. 21, at 560.
5 Academic scholars and practitioners generally encourage in-house counsel to know
how foreign jurisdictions apply the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN,
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 283 (3rd ed. 1997)
(observing that "[c]ross-frontier lawyers would do well to become thoroughly familiar with
the privilege law in each country in which they are rendering legal advice."); Josephine Carr,
Are Your International Communications Protected?, 14 No. 6 ACCA DOCKET 32, 34-38
(November/December, 1996) (listing the status of the attorney-client privilege in European
countries). Although companies would be advised to know how the privilege is applied in
each jurisdiction where legal communications may be sent, companies with operations in
many countries may find it more practical to learn the general parameters of the privilege.
6 The use of the privilege in an international context is the same as the use of the privi-
lege in the United States. In the context of U.S. discovery proceedings, one commentator
has stated: "Knowing well the parameters of the privilege may, with advance planning, allow
a lawyer with foresight to protect what would otherwise have to be disclosed. Knowing the
limits of the privilege will permit the resourceful lawyer to discover and thereby uncover
what an opponent seeks to keep hidden." EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 2. Part III of this com-
ment provides strategies for protecting internal legal communications.
17This note, however, does not discuss the intricacies of the attorney-client privilege in
either the United States or other countries (e.g. raising the privilege in court, rules of comity,
burden of proof for the privilege). These details lie beyond the scope of this journal article.
18 Part III of this note focuses on the main differences in the privilege at the international
level. There are probably as many subtle differences in the application of the attorney-client
privilege as there are jurisdictions. The purpose of this paper is to give readers a good sense
of the differences that in-house counsel may face in other countries.
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protect company information in foreign regions. Finally, Part IV of this
comment concludes by suggesting four strategies that corporate counsels at
multinational firms may use to help protect their companies' sensitive
communications.
Uf. THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL IN THE
UNITED STATES
Although courts in the United States only began extending the attor-
ney-client privilege from private practitioners to in-house counsel in the
early part of the Twentieth Century,1 9 corporate attorneys now regularly as-
sert this privilege to protect confidential communications with corporate
employees from court ordered discovery. 2° Not everything that transpires
between an in-house lawyer and a company employee, however, is pro-
tected by the privilege.2 1 Courts in the United States generally consider
four factors to determine whether the privilege applies to a corporate legal
22memorandum or conversation.
A. The Roots of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel in the United States
derives from a much earlier privilege for lawyers in private practice.2 3
Dean Wigmore refers to this more general privilege as "the oldest of the
privileges for confidentiality known to common law."2 4 According to Dean
Wigmore, the privilege for private practitioners first surfaced and played a
role in jurisprudence during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in England.
19See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.20See infra note 42.
21 See generally RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1988) (discussing the scope of the privilege for organizations). See also EPSTEIN, su-
pra note 15, at 73-86 (reviewing the corporation as a client). Part II.C. of this note discusses
application of the privilege to general counsel.
22See RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (Tentative Draft No. I,
1988). These four factors include the following: (1) a communication, (2) made in confi-
dence, (3) between privileged persons, (4) for the purpose of seeking or obtaining legal ad-
vice. Part H.C. of this note examines these elements. This is not to suggest, however, that
courts have settled all issues involving the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel. As
this part of the note demonstrates, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to this doctrine.
23See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). John Henry Wigmore
served as Dean of Northwestern University School of Law from 1901-1929.
24Id.
25Id. See also PAUL R. RICE, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 9
(ed. 1993 & supp. 1995) (discussing the English common law origins of the U.S. attorney-
client privilege). In the United Kingdom, where the privilege originated, the attorney-client
privilege is referred to as the "legal professional privilege." It is described as the "right
which protects from disclosure confidential communications passing between attorney and
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As Dean Wigmore notes, during this time, "the privilege already appears as
unquestioned. '26 The early English courts granted a privilege for commu-
nications between lawyers and their clients in "consideration for the oath
and the honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of his cli-
ent."27 The jurists who framed the privilege believed that compelling a
loyal attorney to testify against a client would violate the attorney's honor
as a gentleman.28
In the 18th Century, however, the focus of the privilege shifted from
the attorney to the client. Rather than serving the honor of gentlemanly
lawyers, "[the] new theory looked to the necessity of providing subjectively
for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser." 9
As under the former justification, the revised attorney-client privilege en-
sured confidentiality by forbidding the disclosure of client confidences even
by an attorney and at the hands of the law.30
During the 19th Century, the privilege continued to rest on this ration-
ale basis, but evolved as that of the client "to include communications
made, first, during any other litigation; next, in contemplation of litigation;
next, during a controversy but not yet looking to litigation; and lastly, in
any consultations for legal advice, wholly irrespective of litigation or even
of controversy."31 In the United States, courts recognized this justification
and scope for the attorney-client privilege in the early 1800,s.32
At the beginning of the 21st Century, the attorney-client privilege in
the United States remains rooted in a concern, "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interest in the observance of law and administration of jus-
tice. 33 Without such a privilege, the courts reason, clients would withhold
potentially damaging information from their attorneys for fear that such in-
formation could be used against them in a court of law.34 Most courts con-
client, whether by production of documents or by oral evidence." See Aubrey Roberts, Col-
loquium on Attorney-Client Privilege in International Practice, Legal Professional Privilege
in the United Kingdom, 7-SPG INT'L L. PRACTICUM 15 (Spring, 1994).
268 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
27 Id .
"8See id.2 9 Id .
30Id.
3'Id.
32See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826).
33See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
34See RicE, supra note 25, ch. 2:3, at 52 ("The purpose of the privilege in the United
States has always been to encourage people to seek legal advice freely and to communicate
candidly with the attorney during those consultations."). For judicial support of this premise,
see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that the purpose of the attor-
ney-client privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys). The
attorney-client privilege also grants clients the power to decide who may access their confi-
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cur that attorneys need to know all relevant facts to provide their clients
with proper legal advice.35 Providing sound advice, the argument con-
cludes, encourages the client to conform his or her behavior to the law and
thereby promotes the general advancement of public ends by the client.
3 6
Each state has adopted its own privilege rules based on this rationale.37 At
the federal level, the privilege is embodied in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and generally follows the common law doctrine. 8
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel
Although courts in the United States have recognized the attorney-
client privilege for private practitioners since the early 1800's, the Supreme
Court only extended a federal court privilege to in-house counsel in 1915. 39
In that case, United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., the United
States government did not contest a railroad company's right to invoke the
dential information. Attorneys must honor their clients' right to decide which individuals
should have access to disclosed information because, as the argument concludes, the privi-
lege would be meaningless if an attorney could freely discuss the information given in confi-
dence. See Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirements of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing
Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1169, 1172 (1997) (explaining that the attorney-client
privilege traditionally has been justified on the grounds that it encourages clients to "make
full disclosure to their attorney...").
35See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that the profes-
sional privilege's purpose is to maximize representation by lawyers). See also Black, supra
note 9, at 95 ("The privilege is based on the premise that sound legal advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client...").
36See Black, supra note 9, at 76 (observing that courts typically reason that "sound legal
advice or advocacy has the effect of furthering the interests ofjustice."). Forjudicial support
of this conclusion, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383, 384.
37See generally RESTATEmENT, THE LAW GOVERNNG LAWYERS Note to Title A (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 1988) ("Every American jurisdiction provides-either by statute, evidence
code, or common-law doctrine-that neither a client nor the client's lawyer generally may be
asked under the compulsion of a subpoena to testify or otherwise to provide evidence in a
way that reveals the content of confidential communications between client and lawyer in
the course of seeking or rendering legal advice or other legal assistance."). See also Hill, su-
pra note 9, at 168 (noting that all states have adopted some form of the attorney-client privi-
lege and noting its inclusion in the Model Code and Model Rules).
38 FED. R. EvID. 501. The rule reads:
Except as otherwise required by the constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.39See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
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attorney-client privilege.4° In referring to the railroad's claim of privilege,
the Court stated:
The desirability of protecting confidential communications between at-
torney and client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been
too often recognized by text-books and courts to need extended comment now.
If such communications were required to be made the subject of examination
and publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon profes-
sional advice and assistance.4 '
At the present time, all jurisdictions within the United States, both state
and federal, recognize the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel.42
The extent of the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel, however,
may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 3 Moreover, communications
between an in-house lawyer and a corporate employee must meet the gen-
eral rectirements of the privilege to be protected from court ordered dis-
covery. Not everything that passes through an in-house legal department
is protected by the privilege.
C. The Conditions on the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel
Courts in the United States consider several factors to determine
whether the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between an
attorney and a client. According to Dean Wigmore's classic definition of
the attorney-client privilege, the privilege only applies: "(1) [w]here legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his ca-
pacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) are
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
401d. at 319.
41Id.
42See Giesel, supra note 34, at 1172 (observing that the attorney-client privilege applies
to U.S. in-house lawyers); Black, supra note 9 (listing state case law since 1964 which gov-
erns the attorney-client privilege for in-house lawyers); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Association, 320 F.2d 314, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1963) (listing State and Federal cases rec-
ognizing the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel and remarking "[t]hat the privi-
lege has been recognized as available to corporations for more than a century is not open to
serious question."). See also GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, & ROGER C.
CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETmcs OF LAWYERING 222-79 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1994);
Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine, 540 PLI/LiT 589, 589 (February, 1996); EPSrEIN, supra note 15, 73-86;
RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988).
43See EPSTEN, supra note 15, at 18-19 (noting that "[a]lthough state and federal law are
generally the same regarding most aspects of the attorney-client privilege, they are not iden-
tical."). Some states have only enacted a "qualified" attorney-client privilege. See id. at 18.
If important public interests are at stake, for example, the court may waive the privilege. See
id. See also Daiske Yoshida, Note, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Foreign Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 214 (October,
1997) (stating that some states do not fully recognize the attorney-client privilege for in-
house counsel communications with company employees).
44See infra Part III.C.
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protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived." 5 Although Dean Wigmore lists eight consid-
erations, courts in the United States often condense these elements into four
factors: (1) a communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in
confidence; and (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal
assistance to the client.46 Since these four factors are clear and contain the
necessary elements to examine how the attorney-client privilege is applied
to in-house counsel in the United States and abroad, this note focuses on the
four elements.
1. The Meaning of "Communication " in the Corporate Context
For the attorney-client privilege to apply there must first be a "commu-
nication" between an attorney and a client.4  The form of the communica-
tion can be either spoken or written. Nonverbal actions such as head nods
and hand gestures can also serve as forms of communication for privilege
purposes. The meaning of communication in the corporate context is vir-
tually the same as that for attorneys in private practice. As in all attorney-
client privilege matters, the privilege only protects the contents of the
communication from disclosure.0 In other words, the underlying facts of
the communication are not necessarily protected.51 Moreover, if the un-
derlying facts can be discovered from sources other than the privileged
communication, those facts are not privileged5 2
It should be noted that the privilege generally protects confidential
communications from the client to the attorney and, in so far as they would
458 J. WIGMORE, EVIDEN CE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). For application
of Wigmore's fundamental conditions, see, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318, (7th Cir. 1963).
46 See RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1988). The Restatement's definition covers elements of the attorney-client privilege which
are common to United States court decisions. Id. Note to Title A. For additional analysis of
these four factors, see EPSTEIN, supra note 15, 35. For an example of judicial application of
these elements, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950).47See HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 42, at 223; EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at




50See HAzARD, KONiAK & CRAmTON, supra note 42, at 264 (noting that "[t]he attorney-
client privilege protects only 'communications' that are intended to be 'confidential."');
EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 36 (observing that "[t]he privilege protects only the contents of
the communication itself from compelled disclosure...").
51See id.52EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 36, quoting J.P. Foley & Co., Inc. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D.
523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("It should be noted that the privilege pertains solely to the sub-
stance of communications. It does not preclude inquiry into the subject matter of communi-
cations.').
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reveal the client's confidences, communications from the attorney to the
client.53 In other words, courts may deny the privilege for communications
from the attorney to the client which do not contain confidential informa-
tion shared by the client 4
2. The Meaning of "Confidential" in the Corporate Context
For a communication between an attorney and a client to be protected
by the attorney-client privilege, the communication must be made in confi-
dence.55 A communication is confidential for privilege purposes when the
client states that it is made in confidence or the corporate counsel reasona-
bly concludes that the communication was intended to be in confidence. 6
Thus, in deciding this issue, the attorney and client's states of mind are im-
portant.
57
A communication will not be considered confidential if either the gen-
eral counsel or a client reveal its contents to a third party at any time. 8
Moreover, once either the attorney or client has revealed confidential in-
formation, neither the attorney nor the client may reassert its confidential-
ity.59 This is true even when either the attorney or client fails to take
adequate precautions to protect the information or when one party commits
a careless act that results in the release of the confidential information.6
One question that commonly arises in the corporate context is whether
the privilege holds when company employees, who would be considered
clients for privilege purposes, discuss confidential information among
themselves. Although courts in the United States have devised different
standards for handling this question, generally, when an employee who
qualifies as a "client" for attorney-client privilege purposes discloses an in-
53 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding privilege application "where the documents reveal client confi-
dences or provide legal assistance."); Henson v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587
(W.D. Va. 1987) (citing other case law and holding that "[t]he privilege protects the sub-
stance of confidential communications both from the client to the attorney and, according to
the better rule, from the attorney to the client if such would reveal the confidential client
communication.").
54 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Lefiwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 226 (D.D.C.
1995) (burdening the defendant with proving "that his attorney's correspondence to him was
based on confidential information he imparted to his attorney" and denying the privilege be-
cause the documents were business related).
55See HAZARD, KONiAK & CRAMTON, supra note 42, at 224-25; EPSTEIN, supra note 15,
at 117; RSTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 121 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988).
56See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 117.
57Id.
58See generally HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 42, at 271-72; EPSTEIN, supra
note 15, at 173.
59 EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 173.
6°Id.
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house attorney's advice to another member of the "client group," the privi-
lege still holds.6' Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Upjohn seemed to
employ a more liberal standard by suggesting that employees who were not
members of the "client group" could be informed of legally related infor-
mation on a "need-to-know" basis without breaking the privilege's confi-
dentiality bond.62  Many lower courts likewise hold that confidential
communications should be limited to necessary individuals. 3
3. The Meaning of "Privileged Persons" in the Corporate Context
The attorney-client privilege in the United States only exists among
what are referred to as "privileged persons." 64 Privileged persons are de-
fined as (1) the client, (2) the client's lawyer, (3) agents of the lawyer for
purposes of the representation, and (4) communicating agents of either the
client or the lawyer.65 In the United States, the communications from a cli-
ent must be made to someone who is "duly licensed as a lawyer when the
communication was made."'' So, for example, an attorney whose bar
61 See Black, supra note 9, at 76 (noting that courts consider factors such as intent and
necessity in deciding whether conversations between corporate employees about legal advice
retain the attorney-client privilege for that legal advice). See also Barr Marine Prods. Co. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 634 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that an interoffice memo-
randum which memorialized a discussion between corporate counsel and a member of the
control group was entitled to the privilege so long as it was only distributed among other
members of the control group); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 518 (D. Conn.
1976), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2nd Cir. 1976) ("A privileged communication
should not lose its protection if an executive relays legal advice to another who shares re-
sponsibility for the subject matter underlying the consultation.... It would be an unnecessary
restriction of the privilege to consider it lost when top management personnel discuss legal
advice.').62 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981).
63 See, e.g., United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 196 N.J. Super. 553 (N.J. 1984) (limiting
protection to communications held in presence of necessary individuals); Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a corporate communication
is confidential, and therefore entitled to the attorney-client privilege, if it is not disseminated
beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents);
Santrade, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that certain
corporate documents were privileged because they repeated legal advice to those who
needed to have it).
"See RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1988). See also EPSTErN, supra note 15, at 72.65Id. It should be noted that for the most part, an attorney's agents or subordinates are
also included within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2301, at 538 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Agents and subordinates, however, must usu-
ally be working under the direct supervision and control of the attorney. See id. ("T]he
privilege protects communications to the attorney's clerks and his other agents for rendering
his services.').
6See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(observing that in the United States, the scope of people considered privileged is limited to
"a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate..."); Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera
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membership has been withdrawn or suspended does not qualify as a privi-
leged person for such purposes. 67 Since general counsel in the United
States are members of a bar association and licensed as attorneys, in-house
lawyers are also considered "privileged persons" for the doctrine's pur,
poses.68
In the corporate setting, difficulty often arises, however, in determining
which company employees qualify as "clients" for privilege purposes.
Contrary to popular assumptions, courts do not consider every company
employee to be a "client" for every legal matter that arises within the corpo-
ration.69 In the United States, federal and state courts generally apply one
of three tests to determine whether a particular corporate employee qualifies
as a "client" for privilege purposes. The first test, the "Control Group
Test," was announced in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric.
7?
This test focuses on the status of the employee within the hierarchy of the
corporation. If the employee is in a position to take a substantial part in the
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice
of counsel, then that individual is a member of the control group.72
The second standard was formulated in Harper & Row Publishers v.
Decker and is generally called the "Subject Matter Test."73 This test ex-
pands the Control Group Test:
An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group,
is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the
corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communi-
cation at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject
matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt
Co., Ltd., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5954 (D.N.J. 1990) (withholding the attorney-client privi-
lege from Japanese patent agents because they are not members of the local Japanese bar).
See also EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 90, citing Dabney v. Investment Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D.
464, 465-66 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that communications made to a law student are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege). Although most authority seems to restrict the
privilege to members of the bar, Dean Wigmore would extend the privilege to "a profes-
sional legal adviser in his capacity as such." 8 J. WMORE oN EvIDENCE § 2292 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961). For a detailed comparison of the Wigmore and United Shoe standards of
privilege, see Gregg F. LoCascio, Reassessing Attorney-Client Privileged Legal Advice in
Patent Litigation, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1203, 1230-38 (1994).
67See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 90.
68Courts in the United States, in contrast to some foreign jurisdictions, consider in-house
and private attorneys to be virtually the same for privilege purposes. See, e.g., United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358.
69See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 499 U.S. 383 (1981).7 0See id. For a more comprehensive analysis of these three tests and their development,
see EPsTEN, supra note 15, at 73-81.
71 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
721d. at 485. See also Upjohn, 499 U.S. 390 (describing the Control Group Test).
73Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1971).
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with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment.
74
The final test was enunciated in Diversified Industries v. Meredith
where the Eighth Circuit modified the Harper & Row test and created a
more comprehensive rule.75 The test in Diversified holds:
The attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communica-
tion if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal ad-
vice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his
corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation
could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communica-
tion is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate
structure, need to know its contents.76
At the federal level, the Supreme Court has specifically refused to ap-
ply any one of these three tests and has instead opted for a case-by-case
analysis." The Court in Upjohn explained this decision by saying, "[w]e
decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all conceivable
future questions in this area, even were we able to do so. ',78 State courts
and federal courts applying state law generally adhere to one of these three
tests. For example, Illinois courts apply the Control Group Test.79 In se-
lecting the Control Group Test, the Illinois Supreme Court, in fact, explic-
itly refused to follow the Supreme Court's flexible holding in Upjohn.80
4. The Meaning of "'For the purposes of seeking legal advice" in the Cor-
porate Context
To qualify for protection under the attorney-client privilege in the
United States, the communication between a client and a lawyer must be for
the purpose of seeking or obtaining legal assistance. 81 In her book on the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, Professor Epstein pro-
vides a thorough description of this requirement:
741d. at 491-92.
75Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).76id. at 609.
77Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 386.
78
id.
79Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Eire Co., 89 11l.2d 103, 119-20 (Il. 1982).
'Old. at 118-19.
81 HAZARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 42, at 223; EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 93,
147; RESTATEMENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988).
For judicial examples of this standard, see Securities and Exchange Council v. Gulf & West-
em Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981) (extending attorney-client privilege to
legal advice only); Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 226
(D.D.C. 1995) (denying the privilege for documents which were business related and did not
contain personal legal advice).
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At the core of the privilege is that the giving of legal advice protects the
communications from compelled disclosure at the instance of third parties. A
lawyer's communications -- and those of the client -- when the lawyer func-
tions in any other capacity are not protected from disclosure. Thus, for the
privilege to be applicable, the lawyer must act in a legal capacity rather than
perform any of the other functions of law-trained persons in our society. The
mere fact that an individual with a law degree performs a certain function will
not render the communications made to that individual privileged, particularly
when the communications could equally well have been made to an individual
without a law degree.
8 2
Not surprisingly, neither the presence of a lawyer at a meeting nor the
inclusion of a lawyer in written communication will necessarily transform
the communication into one where legal advice is sought or given. 3 For
example, where a non-lawyer corporate officer prepared "risk management"
documents in an attempt to keep track of, to control, and to anticipate the
costs of litigation for business-planning purposes, the privilege did not
stand. 4
In the corporate setting, one problem that often arises is whether a
piece of communication primarily involves legal advice or business ad-
vice.8 5 In general, where the main purpose of the communication is to se-
cure legal advice, but the communication also refers to non-legal matters,
the attorney-client privilege still holds. 6 Conversely, where a communica-
tion primarily involves business advice, the attorney-client privilege does
not apply, even if the communication emanates from, or is directed to, an
attorney 8 7 Some courts may also employ a third alternative, separating the
legal advice from the business advice and only extending protection to the
2 EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 93.
83One common misconception in the corporate context is that whatever touches a law-
yer's hands is protected by the attorney-client privilege. If a lawyer is merely copied on
documents prepared for reasons other than obtaining legal advice, the privilege will not nor-
mally attach. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp.
156, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that documents which had been merely forwarded,
copied, or edited by a lawyer were not protected by the privilege when there was no indica-
tion that legal advice had been sought or provided). For further discussion on this issue, see
EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 153-54.
84Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,402-04 (8th Cir. 1987).8 5See generally Giesel, supra note 34 (providing a comprehensive review of the prob-
lems in-house counsel face with the legal advice requirement of the attorney-client privi-
lege).
86 See, e.g., Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1989). See also
Daly, supra note 2, at 1070 (observing that in these cases, courts in the U.S. frequently re-
solve doubts in favor of the privilege, but some courts may also separate the two types of in-
formation and only allow the privilege to stand for legal portions of the communication).
87See, e.g., Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 226 (D.D.C.
1995) (denying the privilege because the relevant documents were business related). See
also EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 97, citing United States v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212-213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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legal material.8 8 In Hardy v. New York News, Inc., the court took this ap-
proach, "[w]hen the ultimate corporate decision is based on both a business
policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision are not
protected simply because legal considerations are also involved."89
In addition to requiring that communications involve legal advice,
some courts have added that, "[n]ot only must the communication be made
primarily for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, the client
must also reasonably believe the communication to be necessary for that
purpose."' 9 The D.C. Circuit, for example, has characterized this require-
ment as: "Communications made in the reasonable belief that they contain
[] information [necessary to the decision-making process for a particular le-
gal problem] will be protected. However, communications which contain
no such reasonable belief, either because of the status of the employee or
because of the nature of the information, will not be protected." 91
In the United States, in-house counsel at corporations rely on the
statutory and common law attorney-client privilege to protect communica-
tions with managers on issues ranging from internal investigations into cor-
porate wrongdoing to everyday labor and employment law. The privilege
enables the corporate attorney, for the same reason as private practitioners,
to withhold production of this sensitive material in a court of law and
thereby protect the company's sensitive communications.
IRI. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
At the beginning of the 21st Century, nearly every country in the world
recognizes some form of the attorney-client privilege.92 In countries like
88See EPsFEIN, supra note 15, at 97, citing Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D.
633, 643-644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).89Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 643-644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), citing SCM v. Xerox, 70 F.R.D. 508,
517 (D. Conn. 1976).
90See EPSTErN, supra note 15, at 149.
911n re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 n.10 (D.D.C. 1978).
'See generally Julian D. Nihill, Corporate Counsel: II. Recent Developments in Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 31 INT'L LAw. 245, 248-59 (Summer, 1997) (noting developments in
the attorney-client privilege in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda,
Bolivia, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, British West Indies, Ecuador,
England, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Pan-
ama, People's Republic of China, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad, and Tur-
key); Daly, supra note 2, at 1086 (noting that countries often recognize either the existence
of an attorney-client privilege or "professional secret" between an organization and a law-
yer); and Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code
Part I: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 5 (Summer,
1993) (pointing out that the European Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community ("CCBE"), a group that represents lawyers associations across Europe, recog-
nizes the attorney-client privilege). Foreign jurisdictions, however, may refer to the attor-
ney-client privilege differently. In France, for example, the relevant term is the
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Great Britain and Australia, which follow the common law tradition, the
attorney-client privilege is normally found in case law.93 In countries like
Germany and Japan, which belong to the civil law school, the attorney-
client privilege is typically embodied in a civil or penal statute or in ethics
rules promulgated by the local bar association. 94 Even in the former Com-
munist countries of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China,
governments have recently enacted laws recognizing a bond of confidenti-
ality between attorneys and their clients. 95 Some commentators attribute
this seemingly universal recognition of the attorney-client privilege to
democratic processes and movements in this direction.9 6 The European
Court of Justice in AM & S, for example, has posited that "a study of com-
parative law shows that the protection of legal confidence is a characteristic
feature of democratic systems and that, on the other hand, it has little place
in the law of absolutist or totalitarian States.
97
Although most legal systems recognize the attorney-client privilege at
the international level, the scope of the privilege for in-house counsel often
differs between countries.98 Some foreign courts extend the privilege to in-
house counsel, others deny it, and still others place conditions on its appli-
cation to corporate attorneys.99
"Professional Secret." See Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982
E.C.R. 1575, 1622. The English and Irish call this legal doctrine the "Legal Professional
Privilege." Id.
93 See Nihill, supra note 92, at 248.94See id.
95 For the example of Russia, see Edict No. 188 of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion, March 6, 1997, on LEXIS/NEXIS at 1997 SovData DiaLine - SovLegisLine, March 6,
1997; for China, see Charles D. Paglee, Chinalaw Web - Law on Lawyers and Legal Repre-
sentation, Ch. IV, Art. 33; Ch. VII, Art. 44(6) (last modified April 7, 1998)
<http:llwww.qis.netlchinalaw/prclas58.htm>.
96Two commentators have reflected that "[i]n both Europe and the United States, profes-
sional secrecy is one of the foundations upon which the legal profession is based." Carsten
Eggers and Tobias Trautner, "An Exploration of the Difference Between the American No-
tion of "Attorney-Client Privilege" and the Obligations of "Professional Secrecy" in Ger-
many, 7-SPG INT'L L. PRAcTIcuM 23 (Spring, 1994).
97AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1600.
98See generally Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privileges in the United
States Discovery Proceedings, 9 J. INT'L L. Bus. 80, 108 (Spring, 1988) ("Even the almost
universally recognized attorney-client privilege has given rise to discovery disputes in inter-
national antitrust cases. The reason is that the scope of this privilege may differ from one
legal system to the other."). See also AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. pt. 19, at 1610 ("Although the
principle of such protection is generally recognized, its scope and the criteria for applying it
vary..."). The Court in AM & S noted that one reason the attorney-client privilege differs is
the fact that the privilege is a continually evolving doctrine rather than a "static" concept. Id.
at 1601.
99See infra Part II.A.
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A. The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel at the
International Level
The parameters of the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel at
the international level mirror the four elements which are necessary for the
privilege to apply in the United States.1°° Although many of the variances
between national jurisdictions are minor, some of the differences are dras-
tic. By understanding how other countries view these basic requirements,
general counsel can devise strategies to help their corporate employers pro-
tect sensitive communications.
1. The Meaning of "Communication" at the International Level
The main difference in the meaning of "communication" at the inter-
national level appears to be whether the attorney-client privilege applies to
confidential legal documents in the client's possession. Confidential docu-
ments in the hands of an attorney are normallyv shielded from discovery by
some account of the attorney-client privilege. 0' Documents in the client's
possession, however, may not be protected by the privilege. 10 2 In Japan, for
example, "[a]ny documents possessed by the bengoshi [lawyers] are free
from seizure or discovery, however documents created by a bengoshi and
held by the client do not receive this protection." 10 3 Similarly, in the Euro-
pean Community ("EC"), only common law jurisdictions like England and
Ireland protect legal advice in the hands of the client.1°4 The six original
10°This is not to say that all foreign tribunals undergo this analysis. These four elements,
however, seem more or less necessary to assert a legal doctrine which resembles the Anglo-
American concept of the attorney-client privilege.
101 Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1654 (ob-
serving that "[i]t is universally accepted that confidential documents of the kind to which I
have referred in the hands of the lawyer are protected.").
1
02Consequently, in-house counsel should advise company officials in foreign jurisdic-
tions to routinely destroy unnecessary legal files. See generally John Boyd, A.M. & S. and
the In-House Lawyer, 7 Eup. L.R. 493, 494 (Street & Maxwell, Dec. 1982) (noting that an
in-house lawyer should ensure that "files in offices within the EEC are not kept for longer
than necessary."); Carr, supra note 15, at 38 ("All copies must be destroyed or returned to
the legal department.").
103 Jason Main, Note, Invoking the US. Attorney-Client Privilege: Japanese Corporate
Quasi-Lawyers Deserve Protection in U.S. Courts Too, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1558, 1568
(April, 1998). The Japanese approach to documents in the hands of the client may have de-
rived from Germany which also denies protection to legal communications held by clients.
See generally Carr, supra note 15, at 33 (noting that in Germany, any copies in the posses-
sion of the company are not protected by the privilege). For a good overview of the German
version of the attorney-client privilege, see Eggers and Trautner, supra note 75.
'04AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1584, citing a report published by the Consultative Commit-
tee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community.
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Member States, including both France and Germany, only extend protection
to documents in the possession of the lawyer.'05
In addition to this difference in the meaning of "communication," at
least one commentator has noted that some foreign jurisdictions may not
extend the attorney-client privilege to communications from the attorney to
the client. 06 This custom partially resembles the practice of some U.S.
courts which generally honor the privilege for communications from the
attorney to the client, but may deny the privilege when such communica-
tions do not reveal a client's confidences.
2. The Meaning of "Confidential" at the International Level
Although the basic meaning of "confidential" in foreign jurisdictions
appears similar to the meaning of "confidential" in the United States, the
duty of confidentiality may differ in some foreign jurisdictions, especially
the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the People's Re-
public of China. Most foreign jurisdictions require a basic level of confi-
dentiality for a communication to be protected by the privilege!'0 8 In
Australia, for example, knowingly or voluntarily disclosing confidential in-
formation to another party waives the attorney-client privilege.0 9 Simi-
larly, in England, mistakenly disclosing a confidential document normally
forfeits privilege protection for that information." 0
Although most countries require a similar level of confidentiality for
the attorney-client privilege to apply, some governments are more likely to
require in-house counsel to divulge information that would normally be
considered confidential. In the People's Republic of China, for example,
the government has historically taken a more public approach to corporate
051d. Italy also does not protect documents that are in the client's possession. For evi-
dence of the Italian position, see Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, id. at 1653
(noting that in Italy, "protection is wider in civil proceedings [than in criminal proceedings]
but it does not, in any case, appear to extend to documents in the hands of the client.').
"°See EPsT~iN, supra note 15, at 284.
07 See supra note 53-54 and accompanying text.
log See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 102, at 494 (remarking that within the EC's jurisdiction,
"[t]he advice of [an] EC-qualified lawyer may be circulated or copied within the client com-
pany, but presumably not to such an extent as would prejudice its confidentiality and there-
fore its protection from disclosure."). The meaning of confidential perhaps leaves less room
for interpretation that the other three factors. There has been little comment on its applica-
tion at the international level.
1'9Caryl Ben Basat & Julian D. Nihill, Corporate Counsel, 31 INT'L LAW. 245, 249
(Summer 1997), citing In Ampolex Limited v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Canberra) Limited
(1996) 137 ALR 28.
"0°d. at 251, citing International Business Machines Corp. and another v. Phoenix Inter-
national (Computers) Ltd. [1995] 1 ALL E.R. 413 (considering the nature ofmistakenly dis-
closed documents and the circumstances accompanying their disclosure to decide whether
the negligent party should be allowed to reassert a privilege for the documents).
Protecting the Company's Confidential Information
20:145 (1999)
and personal information."' Moreover, lawyers in China have traditionally
been required to place their allegiance to the state above loyalty to an indi-
vidual client."12 Adding to this problem, China has only recently enacted
statutes giving effect to a legal doctrine like the attorney-client privilege."1
3
Thus, the attorney-client privilege in China remains untested and may not
afford much protection when competing state interests are at stake.!
14
Many Eastern European countries are also struggling to establish an
independent legal profession 15 Only in 1997, for example, did the Presi-
dent of the Russian Federation require all information connected with pro-
fessional activities such as lawyering be kept confidential.16 The edict,
however, neither defines the meaning of "confidential" nor states whether
this rule applies to lawyers who work as in-house counsel."
17
Although the extent of protection for communications that are kept
"confidential" may be less certain in countries like China and Russia, in
most countries, "in confidence" carries the same meaning as in the United
States. As a general rule, confidential communications should be limited to
necessary individuals. Moreover, as in the United States, inadvertent dis-
closures are not likely to be protected by the privilege." 8
"'See Lawyer-Client Privilege Under Challenge, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PoST, No-
vember 25, 1996 (quoting Beijing lawyer Tang Jiaodong, "The Chinese way of thinking is
very different from the Western way. The Government thinks it is entitled to know every-
thing about everything.").
12 See generally Daly, supra note 2, at 1093 n.155, citing Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in
China: The Past Decade and Beyond, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 751, 756, 791-92 (1991)
(questioning the independence of Chinese legal professionals).
11 Only in the past few years did the P.R.C. enact the Law on Lawyers and Legal Repre-
sentation, which requires attorneys to keep "a litigant's commercial secrets learned through
conducting the business activities of a lawyer's practice, and should not disclose the privacy
of litigants." See Paglee, supra note 95.
4 Lawyer-Client Privilege Under Challenge, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, November
25, 1996 (quoting a local Chinese practitioner, "[t]he concept of lawyer-client privilege ... is
on the books in China, but not well developed.').
1
5 See Daly, supra note 2, at 1092 ("Each country in Eastern Europe is engaged in its
own unique struggle to establish a truly independent legal profession within its borders.").
116Edict No. 188 of the President of the Russian Federation: On the Approval of the List
of Confidential Items of Information, March 6, 1997, on LEXIS/NEXIS at 1997 SovData
DiaLine - SovLegisLine, March 6, 1997. The Edict states: "For the purposes of further im-
provement of the practice of publication and entry into force of Acts of the President of the
Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation and normative legal acts of
federal executive agencies, I hereby decree: To approve the annexed list of confidential
items of information." Item 4 on the annexed list reads: "Information connected with pro-
fessional activity, the access to which is restricted under the Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration and federal laws (physician's, notary's, lawyer's confidentiality, privacy of
correspondence, telephone talks, mail, telegraph and other messages, etc."
1171d.
IISFor the U.S. position on inadvertent disclosures, see supra notes 108-109 and accom-
panying text.
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3. The Meaning of "Privileged Persons" at the International Level
The most significant difference in the attorney-client privilege at the
international level is in the meaning of "privileged persons." Foreign juris-
dictions often differ as to whether in-house counsel constitute "privileged
persons" for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Countries generally
take one of three approaches to the status of in-house counsel: (1) they are
considered "privileged persons;" (2) they do not constitute "privileged per-
sons;" and (3) they only qualify as "privileged persons" under certain cir-
cumstances. Although there does not seem to be any universal reason for
these different approaches," 9 the attorney-client privilege in each country
often reflects that country's view of whether in-house attorneys are inde-
pendent enough to honor their obligations to the judicial system and,
whether the country's judicial system employs extensive discovery.
120
The first category of countries takes the position that in-house lawyers
are "privileged persons" and thus entitled to protected communications.
Most of these countries have adopted the English common law approach to
in-house legal counsel and the attorney-client privilege. In England, where
the privilege originated, lawyers who work as in-house counsel enjoy the
attorney-client privilege provided they belong to the bar association and,
thereby, operate under the same obligations regarding professional conduct
and duties as attorneys who work in private practice. This approach is
also taken in the United States where in-house counsel must be members of
the bar to qualify for the privileged. 122  Other jurisdictions like Hong
Kong,123 Ireland, t24 and Australia, 2' which follow the British legal system,
have also adopted this approach.
"91It is difficult, for example, to draw a distinction between common and civil law coun-
tries. In Germany, which is a civil law country, in-house counsel may become members of
the bar and enjoy privilege protection under certain circumstances. See infra note 141 and
accompanying text. In Japan, another civil law country, however, in-house counsel do not
belong to the bar and therefore are not protected by an attorney-client privilege. See Main,
supra note 103, at 1561 (explaining that Japanese in-house legal personnel are not admitted
to the Japanese bar); Kahei Rokumoto, The Present State of Japanese Practicing Attorneys:
On the Way to Full Professionalization? in LAWYERS IN SocImTY: AN OvERv EW 134 (Rich-
ard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) (noting that law students enter large business
corporations without possessing the certificate of a lawyer). This difference has arisen even
though, as Marin notes, "Japanese discovery.. .is based strongly on the German system."
Matin, supra note 103, at 1575.20 See infra text accompanying notes 129-31, 136-39.
121 See Roberts, supra note 25, at 16; Burkard, supra note 6, at 684 ("[Iun the U.K. and
Ireland, in-house barristers and solicitors are full-fledged members of the legal profession,
subject to the same rules of professional ethics and discipline as their colleagues in private
practice, including the rights and obligations pertaining to legal privilege.").
122See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
"oUnder Article 34 of the Basic Law of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
("HKSAR") of The People's Republic of China ("PRC"), Hong Kong residents "shall have
right to confidential legal advice, access to courts, and choice of lawyers for protection of
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The second group of countries does not consider in-house counsel to be
"privileged persons" for the doctrine's purposes." 6 Many of these jurisdic-
tions, in contrast to the first category of countries, do not possess a single
unified legal profession and consider in-house legal professionals to be dis-
tinct from private practitioners. 127 A example of this structure occurs in
Austria, where there are six distinct careers which require legal education as
a prerequisite.128 These careers include: (1) prosecutors, (2) judges, (3) pri-
vate practitioners, (4) government employees who are qualified to do legal
work, (5) in-house counsel, and (6) tax lawyers.
1 29
Countries in this group often distinguish in-house counsel from other
lawyers because they believe that attorneys who work for a company are
too dependent on their corporate employers to exercise the same objective
judgment in the practice of law as private practitioners.1 30  For this same
reason, these jurisdictions usually deny in-house lawyers admittance to the
local bar association and the attorney-client privilege that it affords.
131 Pro-
their lawful rights." See Martindale-Hubbell, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LAw DIGEST,
(Reed Elsevier Inc. 1998) on LEXIS/NEXIS.
124 For a discussion of the legal professional privilege under Irish law, see Silver Hill
Duckling v. Minister for Agriculture, 1987 ILRM 516.
125Martindale-Hubbell, Attorneys and Counselors, AUSTRALIA LAW DIGEST, (Reed El-
sevier Inc. 1998) on LEXIS/NEXIS ("Legal professional privilege [is] conferred upon clients
to protect confidential communications from disclosure if made for purposes of giving or
obtaining legal advice or in contemplation of or for purpose of litigation.").
126 In addition to jurisdictions that do not extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house
lawyers, some foreign jurisdictions do not extend the attorney-client privilege to foreign li-
censed attorneys who are not registered in their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Case No. 155/79, AM
& S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, pts. 25-26, at 1612 (in AM & S, the
European Court of Justice ("EC]"), in dictum, noted that in cases before the ECJ, the attor-
ney-client privilege would only be extended to attorneys who are members of a European bar
association and therefore governed by professional rules within the EEC). See also Goebel,
supra note 3, at 502 (noting that at the EC level, neither in-house counsel nor foreign attor-
neys who are not members of a local bar can assert the attorney-client privilege).
127 See Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442, 443 (Del. 1982). In
Renfield, for example, the court noted that there are several categories within the practicing
legal profession in France and that each of these categories provides a function that would be
contained in the duties of an American lawyer. See id.
12 1 See Terry, supra note 92, at 10-11, citing Eugene Salpius, Austria, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 45 (D. Campbell ed., 1982).
129 Id.
13°The primary justification for withholding the attorney-client privilege from in-house
counsel seems to be that corporate attorneys are considered too involved with their corporate
employer to exercise independent judgment and faithfully assist courts in the administration
ofjustice. See Terry, supra note 92, at 55.
131See Daly, supra note 2, at 1099. See also Carr, supra note 15, at 32 (Carr notes that
"[w]hether or not an in-house counsel has legal privilege at the national level in Europe de-
pends on one question. Are they members of their national bar?"). This questioning should
not surprise legal practitioners in the United States where several cases have questioned
whether in-house counsel should be allowed to assert the privilege given the potential con-
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fessor Daly has noted this connection, "[i]n many countries outside the
United States, there is an exceedingly strong but profoundly subtle link
between an organization's right to invoke the attorney-client privilege and
the legal profession's concept of independent professional judgment."
In Europe, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community ("CCBE"), which serves as the coordinating body for the na-
tional bar associations of EC member states, takes this position and requires
lawyers to be independent in order for ethical duties of confidentiality to
apply. 133  Similarly, countries like France134 and Italy135 do not consider
company lawyers to be independent enough to qualify for membership in a
bar association and therefore do not extend the attorney-client privilege to
in-house counsel. In fact, in Italy, private lawyers who take an in-house le-
gal position automatically forfeit their bar membership.1
36
It should be noted that many of the countries that do not consider in-
house counsel to be "privileged persons" for purposes of the attorney-client
privilege only allow limited discovery in legal proceedings and thus rarely"a" 137
sacrifice the confidentiality of internal legal communications. According
flicts of interest. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Council v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 675, 680 (D.D.C. 1981) (questioning the validity of the attorney-client privi-
lege for in-house counsel); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 320 F.2d 314
(7th Cir. 1963) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege should not be extended to corpora-
tions).
132Daly, supra note 2, at 1099.133See Terry, supra note 92, at 5. The code (Section 2.1.1) reads:
The many duties to which a lawyer is subject require his absolute independence, free from all other
influence, especially such as may arise from his personal interests or external pressure. Such inde-
pendence is as necessary to trust in the process of justice as the impartiality of the judge. A lawyer
must therefore avoid any impairment of his independence and be careful not to compromise his pro-
fessional standards in order to please his client, the court or third parties.
Id.
134See Black, supra note 9, at 161 (explaining that French in-house lawyers perform es-
sentially the same functions as U.S. corporate attorneys - providing legal advice on matters
of concern to their corporate employers). It is interesting to note that although France does
not extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel regardless of nationality, U.S.
courts have extended the privilege to French in-house counsel.
135Under Italian law, employment as a civil servant or in private industry is considered
incompatible with the professional legal practice of an "avvocato" because it does not permit
the carrying out of services in an autonomous and independent way. See Hill, supra note 9,
at 160-61, citing ALAN TYRRELL & ZAHD YAQuB, THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW
EUROPE 199-200 (1993).36 See id.
137 See Ian S. Forrester, Legal Professional Privilege: Limitations on the Commission's
Power of Inspection Following the AM & S Judgment, 20 C.M.L.R. 75, 77 (1983) ("In Con-
tinental Europe, discovery of documents in civil cases is very limited in any event, and the
notion of whether legal advice should be exempt from discovery is unlikely to arise."); Mau-
rits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel: A European Proposal, 4
COLuM. J. Eut. L. 125, 125 (Winter/Spring, 1998) (remarking that in Europe, "except [for]
the United Kingdom and Ireland, most European countries do not have the adversarial and
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to one commentator, these two phenomena may even be related in Europe
because, "in the absence of the wide ranging discovery available in com-
mon law countries, most civil law jurisdictions have not seen the need to
develop a more sophisticated set of rules concerning the attorney-client
privilege. 138 Another observer has indicated that this may also be the case
in Japan where the lack of privileges reportedly results from the low level
of discovery allowed under Japanese civil procedure. 13 9 Recent develop-
ments in civil law jurisdictions may also confirm this connection. Accord-
ing to Julian Nihill, "[a]s discovery becomes more widely available, many
civil law jurisdictions, e.g., France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands,
have seen developments in the law concerning the attorney-client privi-
lege. 1 40
In addition to the first two groups of countries, a third category of for-
eign jurisdictions requires in-house counsel to meet certain conditions to
qualify as "privileged persons" for the doctrine's purposes. In the Nether-
lands, for example, in-house counsel must "confirm that they will be treated
as independent lawyers and accept that they will be subject to the bar's
ethical code and discipline" to become members of the local bar and
thereby claim privilege protection.141 Similarly, in Germany, courts only
extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel under two condi-
tions: (1) the in-house attorney must maintain separate offices to which he
or she has sole access; and (2) the general counsel must be acting in his or
her capacity as an attorney.1 2 Thus, in the context of in-house counsel, the
meaning of "privileged persons" at the international level varies from
extensive discovery system that forms the foundation of U.S. litigation."). See also David J.
Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the
United States, 34 AM. J. INT'L LAW 745, 761 (1986) ("Not only are the basic obligations to
produce information more limited in Germany than in the United States, but the standard of
relevancy is significantly higher in Germany."); Marin, supra note 103, at 1585-87 (noting
that Japanese pre-trial discovery is more limited than that of the United States).
138Nihill, supra note 92, at 248.
13 9 See Gary D. Fox, Discovey from Japanese Companies, 22 TRIAL 18, 20 (Aug. 1986),
cited in Marin, supra note 103, at 1600 n.278. See also Yoshida, supra note 43, at 210, 224
n.90 ("[U]nder both the old and new Civil Procedure Code, parties in Japanese litigation are
given broad latitude to withhold documents that are for personal use (such as notes or inter-
nal memoranda), concern technical or trade secrets, or contain information that members of
certain professions -- such as lawyers, patent advisors and doctors - learned in the course of
their business.'). For further information about the Japanese discovery system, see Main,
supra note 103, at 1574-75, 1582-87.
140Nihill, supra note 92, at 248. See also Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German
Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession, in LAWYERs IN SocMTY: AN OVERVIEw 103
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) (providing a good overview of the German
legal profession and noting that some in-house lawyers are admitted as advocates in Ger-
many).
141Carr, supra note 15, at 34.
142Id. at 33.
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country to country. Even among civil law countries, the privilege may or
may not apply to corporate lawyers. 143 In understanding the global pa-
rameters of the privilege, in-house lawyers at multinational corporations
should be aware of these differences.
4. The Meaning of "For the Purposes of Seeking Legal Advice" at the In-
ternational Level
At the international level, communications must also be for the purpose
of seeking legal advice to be protected by the attorney-client privilege. The
degree to which a communication must concern legal advice, however, may
vary between jurisdictions and even within countries. By way of illustra-
tion, the European Court of Justice has considered whether allegedly privi-
leged documents had been written "exclusively, primarily or only partly for
the purposes of legal advice or litigation."'144 Similarly, one court in Eng-
land has emphasized that communications between attorneys and their cli-
ents must be for the "dominant" purpose of obtaining legal advice to fall
under the privilege.145 Another court in England, however, has held that "a
solicitor's professional duties were not restricted to advice on matters of
law or construction, but included advice on the commercial wisdom of en-
tering a particular transaction in respect of which legal advice was
sought."' 4
The nature of the attorney-client privilege is such that most foreign
countries consider whether a particular piece of communication between an
attorney and a client concerns legal advice before honoring the privilege for
it. Generally, therefore, in-house counsel should expect protection for a
relatively narrow range of documents. The farther that a communication
strays from legal advice, the less protection it will likely be afforded.
B. An Example of the Pitfalls of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House
Counsel at the International Level
The parameters of the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel at
the international level vary more than in the United States. Some countries
apply the privilege, some jurisdictions deny the privilege, and still other
states qualify the privilege for in-house counsel. These different applica-
143 See supra note 119.
'"Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1588.
14See Waugh v. British Railways Board, [1979] 3 WLR 150 (commenting that commu-
nications must be for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice to be protected by the
privilege).
146Basat & Nihill, supra note 109, at 251, citing Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Hold-
ing NV v. Bacon & Woodrow [1995] 1 ALL E.R. 976. Likewise in Australia, courts appear
to apply a more relaxed standard; the privilege normally applies when a communication is
made for purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice or in contemplation of or for purpose
of litigation. See AUSTRALIA LAW DIGEST, supra note 125.
Protecting the Company's Confidential Information
20:145 (1999)
tions of the privilege can lead to disastrous consequences for in-house
counsel and the corporations they advise.147 Written memoranda sent to
employees in countries that do not protect communications from in-house
attorneys could, for example, end up as evidence in a local legal contest. 148
Two cases in Europe during the 1980's exemplified this danger. Although
other articles have discussed these opinions in great detail, both examples
merit another mentioning in this context.
149
The first case involved an Australian subsidiary in England called
Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Limited ("AM & S").'5° In 1979,
the European Community Commission ("EC Commission"), which exe-
cutes European Community law, decided to investigate AM & S for possi-
ble violations of the EC Treaty's antitrust provisions.15' During the course
of its investigation, the EC Commission traveled to AM & S's premises in
Bristol, England, and demanded documents concerning the company's
business practices. 52 AM & S refused, however, to produce several of the
requested papers because the documents contained advice from the com-
pany's lawyers and were therefore, AM & S believed, protected from dis-
covery by the attorney-client privilege. 5 3 Among the documents that AM
& S withheld were legal memoranda from in-house counsel to company
employees.'5 4 When the EC commission persisted in demanding the docu-
ments, AM & S sought an injunction at the EC level against the Commis-
147See generally supra note 13 and accompanying text.
1
48See Carr, supra note 15, at 33 (noting that "[a] letter sent to a company in a country
with a system of discovery may well end up being produced in court if a dispute arises.").
149There has already been much discussion in journal articles about the AM & S and John
Deere decisions. For good coverage of these decisions from an American perspective, see
Goebel, supra note 3; Hill, supra note 9; and Burkard, supra note 6. AM & S also caused
much debate in Europe, especially between civil law and common law jurisdictions. For
good coverage of the AM & S decision from a European perspective, see Forrester, supra
note 137; Sandy Ghandhi, Legal Professional Privilege in European Community Law, 7
EuR. L.R. 308 (Street & Maxwell, Aug. 1982); Jonathan Faull, Legal Professional Privilege
(AM & S): The Commission Proposes International Negotiations, 10 EuR. L.R. 119 (Street
& Maxwell, April 1985); Jonathan Faull, A.M. & S.: The Commission's Practice Note, 8
EUR. L.R. 411 (Street & Maxwell, Dec. 1983); and Boyd, supra note 102.
'50Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. AM & S
was considered a very important case when it was decided in 1982. The governments of the
United Kingdom and France both intervened in the case as did the Consultative Committee
of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community. See id. at 1577.
...1d. at 1579. (the European Commission investigated AM & S for "...competitive con-
ditions concerning the production and distribution of zinc metals and its alloys and zinc con-
centrates in order to verify that there [was] no infringement of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty.").
I521d. at 1579.
153 Opinion of Mr. Advocate-General Warner, id. at 1626.
tmThis statement also comes from the fact that the opinion talks at length about whether
the attorney-client privilege applies to documents from in-house counsel. Id. pt. 27, at 1612.
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sion. 5 5 After a lengthy discussion of the issues, the European Court of Jus-
tice held that in EC proceedings, communications with in-house lawyers are
not protected by the attorney-client privilege.15 6 The court reasoned, in ac-
cordance with principles common to EC Member States, 15 7 that in-house
counsel were, by nature, too dependent on their corporate employers to
faithfully assist in the administration of justice and therefore should not be
entitled to protected communications under the attorney-client privilege.1
5 1
The second example of problems with the privilege at the international
level arose shortly after AM & S when the EC Commission launched an in-
vestigation of the American company John Deere and it's European opera-
tions for alleged violations of EC antitrust provisions. 5 9 This time,
however, during the on-site investigation, inspectors seized legal memo-
randa from John Deere's general counsel to European and U.S. managers. 16°
Some of the in-house documents cautioned the company's managers that
John Deere's efforts to constrain parallel exports in Europe and prevent in-
tra-EC exports of John Deere machinery might violate EC and national
competition laws.' 6 '
When the EC Commission considered the case against John Deere, it
relied on John Deere's in-house legal memoranda to conclude that John
Deere had "intentionally" violated EC antitrust statutes. In its opinion, the
Commission, for example, noted: "Deere's own in-house counsel expressed
doubts as to the legitimacy of such a device.' 62 The Commission's conclu-
sion also referred to legal advice from John Deere's corporate attorneys,
"Deere and Company knew that such conduct, and, in particular, the con-
tractual export ban, was contrary to EEC and national competition law. It
151d. at 1580.
1161d. pts. 24 & 27, at 1612.
157In deciding the question of whether communications between in-house attorneys and
company clients were protected, the European Court of Justice noted that the attorney-client
privilege is not specifically recognized anywhere in the procedural regulations that govern
the Commission's conduct in the antitrust area and that the privilege did not exist as a matter
of basic rights absorbed from "principles and concepts common" to all Member states. Id.
pt. 18, at 1610.
'5 11d. pt. 24, at 1612 (basing its decision on "the requirement as to the position and status
as an independent lawyer, which must be fulfilled by the legal adviser from whom the writ-
ten communications which may be protected emanate, is based on a conception of the law-
yer's role as collaborating in the administration ofjustice by the courts and as being required
to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal as-
sistance as the client needs.").
159Re Deere & Co. v. Cofabel NV, Commission Decision of December 14, 1984, [1985]
2 C.M.L.R. 554, pt. 15, at 558 (the EC Commission accused Deere & Co. of pressuring its
regional dealers to restrict sales between EC Member States).
1601d. pt. 9, at 557; pt. 21 at 560.
161Id. pt. 39, at 563.
'621d. pt. 27, at 562.
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was advised on this by its in-house counsel."1 63 The EC Commission even
used this evidence, and the intent to violate EC antitrust provisions that it
allegedl showed, to justify much higher punitive sanctions against John
Deere.'
The decisions in AM & S and Deere & Co. considerably "chilled"
communications between in-house counsel at multinationals and their cor-
porate clients.165  Many corporate attorneys, for example, feared docu-
menting internal legal "soft-spots" that involved Europe.1 66  Professor
Gruner summarized this predicament as follows: "In a system which affords
only narrow privilege and immunity protections for compliance evaluations,
information about corporate misconduct which is collected in compliance
evaluations becomes a source of threats to companies which is separate
from the misconduct itself."167
Even more troubling for in-house counsel, the AM & S and John Deere
cases were not isolated events. At the EC level alone, companies such as
Shell International Petroleum, Montell, United International Pictures, and
Digital Equipment Co. Ltd. have been raided by EC investigators.168 Nor
are the problems caused by cases like AM & S, and contained in litigation
like Deere & Co., in the past. 69 As one observer has recently noted, "the
emergence of national competition laws cloned from EC law.. .combined
with increasing number of business transactions requiring antitrust advice
[have] amplified concerns over the limits of the legal privilege. 1 70
163 Id. pt. 21, at 560.
1641d. pts. 39-40, at 563.
165See Burkard, supra note 6, at 685 (noting that AM&S has had a "chilling effect" on
communications about European antitrust matters at many multinational corporations). See
also Boyd, supra note 102, at 493 (observing that AM & S should be of concern to every
company with European operations that utilize in-house legal advice); Faull, The Commis-
sion Proposes International Negotiations, supra note 149, at 124 (remarking that "[t]he AM
& S case may be seen to have opened a Pandora's box with enormous implications for the
Community in both its internal and its external relations."); Ghandhi, supra note 149, at 313
(noting that "[tihe decision of the Court [in AM & S]...is bound to cause deep consternation
to the legal profession in the United Kingdom generally and in particular to corporate law-
yers.").
'"6Gruner, supra note 6, at 1175-1176 (observing that the result of the attorney-client
privilege not being extended to in-house counsel is that "firms might avoid aggressive self-
analyses of internal corporate misconduct.. .due to the threat of disclosure of the resulting
evaluations.").
'67Gruner, supra note 6, at 1176.
16s Carr, supra note 15, at 32.
16 9See Faull, The Commission Proposes International Negotiations, supra note 149, at
139 (remarking that AM & S has "never ceased to be controversial.").
170See Dolmans, supra note 137, at 125.
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IV. STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS IN A
GLOBAL SETTING
Given the many differences in the attorney-client privilege for in-house
counsel at the international level, corporate counsel at multinationals face
the real possibility of seeing their communications with employees in other
countries appear in foreign legal proceedings. However, in-house attorneys
are not without recourse. This note focuses on four common measures that
general counsel can take to protect their communications with employees in
foreign countries: (1) communicate orally, (2) hire local outside counsel, (3)
select favorable choice of law and forum contract provisions, and (4) lobby
for changes in the rules of foreign jurisdictions. The use of these alterna-
tives may be influenced by considerations such as the potential of litigation
arising in a particular matter or the complexity of the legal advice. As Pro-
fessor Daly notes, "[p]reservation of the privilege is not always an overrid-
ing consideration."'  In-house counsel should thus weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of these options before using them.
A. Communicate Orally
The most secure and least expensive way to protect sensitive commu-
nications from court ordered discovery in foreign jurisdictions is to use oral
communications instead of written documents.' 7 Wherever possible and
especially when the communication involves a potentially litigious issue,
companies should bring the concerned individuals together to discuss the
matter in person.173 When personal meetings are not possible, a telephone
or conference call may be the next best altemative.' 74
Oral communications offer greater security for discussions with em-
ployees in foreign countries for two reasons. First, many foreign jurisdic-
171 Daly, supra note 2, at 1086.
172 Both academic commentators and practitioners recommend using oral communica-
tions whenever the information may be so communicated and, especially when the commu-
nication involves a potentially litigious issue. See Mary C. Daly, The Ethical Implications of
the Globalization of the Legal Profession: A Challenge to the Teaching of Professional Re-
sponsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1239, 1279 n.135 (April,
1998) (recommending that communication should be restricted to oral advice whenever
practical); Burkard, supra note 6, at 680; Boyd, supra note 102, at 494; Carr, supra note 15,
at 38 ("[E]ven where the lawyer suspects a breach by a business unit, his suspicions and any
evidence collected in an attempt to establish the breach and correct it must be communicated
orally to the relevant people within the company and kept with external counsel.").
'73See Boyd, supra note 102, at 494 (noting that "a face to face meeting will give the
lawyer an opportunity to understand and make an impression on the client (and vice
versa)."); Carr, supra note 15, at 33 (reporting that one general counsel in Italy has taken the
approach, "as there is no privilege at all in Italy for in-house lawyers, he always deals with
branch offices by visiting them and never allows them to send any sensitive documents to
Italy.').
174 See generally Carr, supra note 15, at 38.
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tions, and especially civil law countries, do not practice extensive discovery
and therefore do not typically ask for oral testimony from a litigant, even in
ordinary civil proceedings. 15 Under the German Code of Civil Procedure,
for example, "parties are not under an unqualified obligation to answer in-
terrogatories and may not be compelled to testify." 176 Similarly, as one ob-
server has pointed out, "Japan does not even have a term in its lexicon
equivalent to discovery.,
177
The AM & S and Deere & Co. cases also support this conclusion. In
both instances, the EC Commission seems to have based its allegations
solely on written legal memoranda which it obtained during raids on the
companies' premises. 78  Many commentators have subsequently pointed
out that if the companies' in-house attorneys had discussed the anti-trust
matters with their European managers in person or over the phone, the
damaging legal opinions would have likely remained confidential.
179
Second, the use of oral communication is better than a written ex-
change because many foreign jurisdictions do not extend the attorney-client
privilege to attorney correspondence in the hands of the client. 80 In other
words, oral discussions prevent the seizure of legal advice which might be
found in a foreign manager's office.' 81 It should be noted that because of
this problem, in-house counsel should instruct the company's foreign op-
erations to routinely destroy any handwritten notes that summarize legal
discussions.'
82
Communicating orally does not, however, come without its disadvan-
tages. As Josephine Carr observes, "this approach inevitably reduces effec-
175See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
176 Riechenberg, supra note 98, at 88, citing Martens, Erfahrungen mit Rechtshilfeer-
suchen aus den USA, 27 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WiRTscHAFr 725, 729-730 (1981);
Gamp, Die Bedeutung des Ausforschungsbeweises im Zivilprozess, 60 DEUTsCHE
R.iCHTERZEITUNG 165 (1982); Judgments of July 9, 1974 and of February 18, 1970, Bundes-
gerichtoshof ("BGH"), 27 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift ("NFW") 1710, and BGH, 27
NJW 751.
177Yoshida, supra note 43, at 210, 224 n.90. See also supra note 138 and accompanying
text.
178 Neither the AM & S opinion nor the Deere & Co. decision refer to any testimony from
in-house legal counsel or other company employees. For AM & S, see Case No. 155/79, AM
& S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. For Deere & Co., see Re Deere & Co.
v. Cofabel NV, Commission Decision of December 14, 1984, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 554.
179Burkard, supra note 6, at 680 ("[T]oday one might say that the advice should have
been spoken and not written."); Boyd, supra note 102, at 494 (in the wake of AM & S, sug-
gesting that in-house counsel should ensure that communications between "him and his cli-
ent are, so far as practicable, oral rather than written;...").
'80As previously noted, many countries do not honor the attorney-client privilege for
documents in the hands of company employees. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying
text.
1
81 See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
182See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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tiveness and is frustrating."'183 Corporate counsel may find it difficult to
bring the relevant parties together to discuss an important legal matter, es-
pecially on short notice. 84 Moreover, oral conversations with company
employees may not be as effective as written communications in reminding
company employees about important legal policies. 185 Given that oral
communication involves these tradeoffs, in-house counsel should evaluate
the necessity of employing oral communication before using this method to
protect the contents of sensitive legal matters.
B. Hire Local Outside Counsel
Perhaps the second most effective way to protect the confidentiality of
sensitive legal communications is to hire outside counsel in the foreign ju-
risdiction. ' In complex matters that may potentially lead to litigation, use
of local outside counsel and a written legal opinion may be the best way to
advise the corporate client and ensure the confidentiality of those communi-
cations. 187 In the EC, many American and Europe companies regularly em-
ploy outside counsel to secure the privilege.' 88
Channeling advice through local outside counsel is generally prefer-
able to communications between in-house counsel and corporate clients be-
cause every jurisdiction with the privilege honors the confidentiality of
communications between private practitioners, who belong to a local bar
association, and their respective clients.189 In some jurisdictions such as It-
aly documents must still be retained in the local counsels' offices for the
privilege to apply.' 90 Thus, in-house counsel should again direct company
employees to routinely destroy any correspondence from outside counsel
and handwritten notes that summarize conversations with the company's
private attorneys.
191
183 Carr, supra note 15, at 34.
'84See generally Boyd, supra note 102, at 494 (remarking that oral communications pre-
sent "obvious practical difficulties associated with a clientele which is numerous and geo-
graphically scattered;...").
185See id. (noting that oral communication carries "the risk of misunderstanding if the
subject-matter is complicated or technical;...").
186Carr, supra note 15, at 38 (suggesting use of local private practitioners for certain
communications); Boyd supra note 102, at 495 (recommending use of outside counsel in
certain situations).
187 Carr, supra note 15, at 38; Boyd, supra note 102, at 494.
188 See Carr, supra note 15, at 34.
189See generally supra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text.
190For Italy and other countries, see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
"' Again, these types of documents would be discoverable because they are held by the
client. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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To obtain the privilege, in-house counsel may either render the legal
advice themselves and channel it through the outside counsel 92 or ask the
local firm to form the legal opinion and communicate directly with the cor-
porate client. Depending on a corporation's operations in the local juris-
diction, the company may also consider hiring an attorney on secondment
from a local law firm. 193 Secondments can use their law firm's letterhead to
obtain the privilege and generally have a better understanding of the com-
pany's operations.
9 4
The drawbacks to hiring local outside counsel for sensitive communi-
cations are generally two-fold. First, retaining a local law firm can be ex-
pensive, especially if there is little or no chance of litigation. 195 Second,
employing outside counsel often requires in-house lawyers to invest consid-
erable time clarifying the local counsel's role in relation to the company as
well as special U.S. extraterritorial legislation like the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.'9 6 Professor Daly refers to these problems as "the embedded
culture clash.' '197 Consequently, in-house counsel should first consider the
degree of risk in a particular matter before turning to outside counsel. 9 8 It
may be that hiring outside counsel is only necessary, as Professor Daly
notes, when the prospect of litigation is "highly likely.'1
99
192Carr, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that some European corporate attorneys simply send
their own legal advice "out to an external firm to be put onto that firm's letterhead.'). In her
article, Carr explains how the practice of hiring outside counsel to maintain the confidential-
ity of internal communications in the Netherlands even led some local private practitioners
to agree in principle that in-house lawyers should be allowed to become members of the bar
and have their communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. See infra text ac-
companying notes 207-08.
19 3 See Diana Bentley, A Network of Expertise: Diana Bentley on a Group for In-House
Counsel in Europe, FINANCIAL TImEs (LoNDoN), September 3, 1996, at 12 (suggesting use of
secondments in foreign countries). In the context of a corporate law department, a second-
ment is normally when an attorney who regularly works for a private law firm is temporarily
assigned to an in-house legal group. The American Corporate Counsel Association's Euro-
pean Branch, which represent approximately 100 in-house practitioners in Europe, has advo-
cated the use of secondments. See id.
194See generally Carr, supra note 15, at 38. Secondments can also normally be negoti-
ated for a sensible monthly fee. See Bentley, supra note 193.
195Bentley, supra note 193; Daly, supra note 2, at 1086-87.
196See Daly, supra note 2, at 1078-79 (describing the need to "educate" foreign outside
law firms because of differences between U.S. and foreign outside counsel). The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act generally prohibits U.S. companies from bribing foreign government
officials. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as
amended by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)).
197 Daly, supra note 2, at 1081.
'98 See id. at 1086-87.
'99Id. at 1086.
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C. Select Favorable Choice of Law and Forum Contract Provisions
To protect company information from discovery in cross-border con-
tract disputes, in-house legal groups should generally stipulate to forum and
choice of law provisions that ensure all ensuing disagreements will be liti-
gated in jurisdictions that extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house
counsel and under rules that recognize this privilege for corporate attor-
neys.20 0 For example, in-house counsel should avoid litigation in forums
like Italy or France that do not honor the confidentiality of communications
between general counsel and corporate employees. 20 1 On the other hand,
corporate negotiators should advocate using jurisdictions like England or
Hong Kong which offer a more favorable privilege climate.20 2 The selec-
tion of agreeable forum and choice of law clauses in contracts will not, or
course, protect corporations with offices in foreign jurisdictions from non-
contractual civil or criminal actions against the company. This would not
have helped, for example, in cases like AM & S and John Deere which both
involved civil law violations.20 3  Between contracting parties, however,
choosing a pro-corporate forum will help protect internal legal communica-
tions.
D. Lobby for Changes to the Rules in Foreign Jurisdictions
A fourth option for in-house counsel is to lobby foreign jurisdictions
that do not recognize a privilege for corporate attorneys to change their
rules.2 4 In the age of multinational corporations, most countries possess an
2
00Some foreign jurisdictions may employ rules that do not allow contracting parties to
freely negotiate forum and choice of law provisions when the contract relates to that local
jurisdiction. This suggestion, of course, would not help under these circumstances.
201 For the law in Italy and France, see Carr, supra note 15, at 34, 38.
202Both England and Hong Kong extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel.
For England, see Roberts, supra note 25. For Hong Kong, see supra note 123 and accompa-
nying text.
203 For AM & S, see Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R.
1575 (the EC Commission instituted the action against AM & S rather than a contracting
party). For Deere & Co., see Re Deere & Co. v. Cofabel NV, Commission Decision of De-
cember 14, 1984, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 554 (the case brought against Deere & Co. was also
brought by the Commission).2
04See Daly, supra note 2, at 1108 (remarking that "in-house lawyers are not resigned to
the status quo."). Even in jurisdictions that have not traditionally afforded in-house counsel
the right to protect communications under the attorney-client privilege, there has been dis-
cussion about the merits of such a movement. The AM & S and Deere & Co. cases resulted
in much debate within Europe. See Faull, The Commission Proposes International Negotia-
tions, supra note 149 at 124 (observing that the AM & S decision carried "enormous impli-
cations for the Community in both its internal and its external relations."); Faull, The
Commission's Practice Note, supra note 149, at 411 (calling the court's decision in AM & S
"controversial"). See also Forrester, supra note 137, at 75; Ghandhi, supra note 149, at 308;
and Boyd, supra note 102, at 493.
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interest in extending privilege protection to in-house legal practitioners.0 5
Although companies from jurisdictions that do not extend the privilege to
in-house counsel have traditionally enjoyed quasi-confidential communica-
tion under limited local discovery practices,"' as these companies expand
abroad they will increasingly face the discovery wrath of foreign tribunals,
precisely because their home jurisdictions do not extend the privilege to
their own legal professionals. 2°7 Some courts in the United States, for ex-
ample, deny the attorney-client privilege to in-house legal practitioners who
are not entitled to the privilege in their own country.0 8
During the last fifteen years, government representatives and bar asso-
ciation officials have conducted negotiations on extending the privilege to
in-house counsel. These efforts have met with some success and can be
strengthened and continued.209  In the Netherlands, for example, the in-
house lawyer's association, Nederlands Benootschap va Bedrijfsjuristen,
has persuaded the government and the local bar association to allow in-
205In addition to the reason provided in the text, many scholars argue that recognizing a
privilege for in-house counsel would promote compliance with the law. See, e.g., Dolmans,
supra note 137, at 125-26 ("This would allow in-house counsel the freedom to advise its cli-
ent about the legal consequences of conduct without fear that its advice and any confessions
made by the client will be subject to I scrutiny later."); Hill, supra note 9, at 186-89 (as-
serting that in-house counsel may be better able to persuade clients to behave lawfully). This
is the reasoning which supports the privilege for attorneys, including in-house counsel, in the
United States. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. The counter-argument, which
many other countries citeJs that a corporate attorney's dependence on the company prevents
him or her from performing this function adequately. See infra notes 129-31. This comment
suggest that as new arguments, such as the one provided in the text, arise at the international
level, the balance in these jurisdictions may shift in favor of extending the privilege to in-
house counsel. For a good review of the arguments for and against extending the privilege
to in-house lawyers, see Hill, supra note 9.
206See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.207There is evidence that many civil law jurisdictions have already seen developments in
the attorney-client privilege because discovery has become more widespread. See infra note
140 and accompanying text.
208See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., Ltd., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5954
(D.N.J. 1990) (withholding the attorney-client privilege from Japanese in-house patent
agents who performed the "functional equivalent" of an attorney, but did not belong to the
Japanese Bar Association). But contrast with Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A.,
98 F.R.D. 442, 443 (D.De. 1982) (explaining that French in-house legal professionals who
did not belong to a French bar association should be entitled to the privilege because they
performed essentially the same functions as United States corporate attorneys-providing
legal advice on matters of concern to their corporate employers).
2"9 Despite generally positive reports, recent comments by a long-time European observer
suggest that little progress has been made at the EC level since the AM & S decision in 1982.
See Jonathan Faull, In-House Lawyers and Legal Professional Privilege: A Problem Revis-
ited, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 139 (Winter/Spring, 1998). Interestingly, Faull seemed much
more optimistic about the EC Commission's desire to negotiate acceptable privilege agree-
ments with other countries shortly after AM & S was decided. See Faull, The Commission
Proposes International Negotiations, supra note 149.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:145 (1999)
house counsel to become members of the bar and enjoy confidential com-
munications under the attorney-client privilege.210 The in-house lawyer's
association successfully argued that corporate counsel in Holland were only
using outside counsel to ensure that company information remained confi-
dential under the attorney-client privilege and that "there was no reason to
give members of the bar a monopoly on protected communications. ''2U
In Belgium, the American Bar Association ("ABA") has likewise met
with the Brussels Bars to discuss the status of privileges for foreign attor-
neys practicing in Belgium.212 These negotiations have led the Brussels
Bars to agree in principle to protect and defend the professional privileges,
including the attorney-client privilege, of U.S. lawyers practicing in Bel-
gium.21 3 Many American attorneys working in Europe assisted the ABA in
these negotiations.214
At the EC level, the ABA has also asked the EC Commission to review
its decision in AM & S and recognize the privileges of foreign attorneys for
the sake of preventing disharmony.21 5 In particular, the ABA has requested
the EC Commission to grant a client's written correspondence with Ameri-
can attorneys the same procedural protections against disclosure as a cli-
ent's correspondence with EC lawyers.21 6 The ABA has asserted that in the
United States, "courts recognize that, to maintain order and stability within
the international community, they must in appropriate circumstances ac-
commodate the rights and privileges afforded by foreign legal systems.
21°See Carr, supra note 15, at 34.211id.
212See Terry, supra note 2, at 1419, citing Agreement, Aug. 6, 1994, American Bar
Ass'n-French Language Order of the Brussels Bar-Duty Language Order of the Brussels
Bar.213 Id. (noting that in the agreement, the Brussels Orders agreed to "protect and defend"
the professional privileges, including the attorney-client privilege of U.S. lawyers registered
on the Foreign Lawyer Lists).
2 14
1d.
215See Report from the European Law Committee, ABA International Law and Practice
Section (Feb. 1983). During the AM & S litigation, many observers, including the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom and several European commentators, called for extending the
privilege to in-house counsel from countries that required corporate attorneys to be members
of the Bar and therefore uphold the same ethical standards as private attorneys. See Case
No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. One of the Advocate
General's in the AM & S case also came out strongly in favor of extending the privilege to
in-house counsel provided that the corporate attorneys were subject to rules of professional
discipline and ethics. See Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, id. at 1644.216See Report from the European Law Committee, ABA International Law and Practice
Section (Feb. 1983).2171d. at 9.
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The American Corporate Counsel's European Branch has supplemented the
ABA's lobbying efforts at both the EC and local level.218
The primary shortcoming of negotiating privilege protection for in-
house attorneys is that most national, if not provincial, jurisdictions apply
their own privilege rules in disputes within their jurisdiction.21 9 For exam-
ple, neither the EC nor the U.S. government can negotiate an agreement that
covers all of the courts within their geographical boundaries. 210 Thus, it is
been difficult to achieve comprehensive, region-wide protection.
In its brief for the AM & S case, the CCBE asserted that countries ap-
pear to be moving in the direction of providing more protection for confi-
dential communications between attorneys and clients.221 There is room for
bargaining and substantial reasons for extending the privilege to in-house
counsel.222 Therefore, in-house counsel should continue to lobby foreign
jurisdictions to change restrictive privilege rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel is fairly
predictable in the United States, the scope of the privilege differs in foreign
countries. Even among civil law jurisdictions like Germany and Japan, the
application of the privilege for corporate attorneys differs in meaningful
ways.22 These variations present general counsel with the difficult chal-
lenge of providing corporate clients in foreign offices with effective legal
advice while also maintaining the confidentiality of those communications
and the company's information. To mitigate this problem, in-house counsel
should become familiar with the contours of the privilege at the interna-
tional level and, when necessary, take protective steps such as communi-
cating information orally or employing local outside counsel to maintain the
confidentiality of internal discussions. With foresight and use of these
measures, general counsel can avoid many of the pitfalls of the attorney-
client privilege at the international level.
218See Bentley, supra note 193 (noting that the American Corporate Counsel Associa-
tion's European branch is pushing for a new EU directive that would extend the privilege to
in-house counsel in Europe).219See Faull, The Commission Proposes International Negotiations, supra note 149, at
121 (commenting on the difficulty of negotiating at the EC level).
2'0See id.
221Case No. 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1584. See
also In-house Lawyers Score in Full-Recognition Battle, LAw. INT'L, Dec. 1995, at 3.222See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
223See supra note 119.
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